Introduction
The advent of the internet in the early 1990s brought with it major changes in science and university-based research (Peters, Marginson and Murphy, 2009 ). The last two decades have seen considerable development of what can be called 'global science', organised in the form of a single accessible research system articulated by worldwide English language journals, collaborative networks and cross-border projects, the growing mobility of personnel, two large-scale data repositories focused on publication and citation metrics that are managed by Thomson-Reuters and Elsevier respectively, and the research ranking of institutions and national systems (Marginson, 2014) . National research systems continue -and across the world have become increasingly active sites -while at the same time they are partly subsumed into the global science system, to which they relate with greater or lesser effectiveness. Simultaneously, in policy circles there has been growing emphasis on investment in R&D and in some countries 'world-class universities' (Altbach and Salmi, 2011) , and programmes designed to enhance industry innovation. States now pursue R&D and university research policy in the manner of the 'global competition state' (Cerny, 1997) . They are constantly aware at both local/national and global/regional levels, focused on global comparisons, and consider strategy and programmes with an eye on what their competitors are doing; much as they have long done in relation to military technology and energy sources (Bayly, 2004) . Strategically, they mostly parallel and imitate each other, like cautious conglomerates maneuvering for an incremental advance in their market share. More rarely they innovate, hoping to differentiate themselves to secure advantage. Whether it is grounded in reality or not, national capacity in science and technology are now seen as key 'causes' of economic growth and prosperity, seen, in fact, as basic to modernity itself. This paper compares and seeks to explain two differing responses to this common ecology: trajectory of the state, its research institutes and universities in Russia, and the trajectory of states and university systems in East Asia and Singapore (principally but not only in China) in the last two decades. In this article, 'East Asia' refers to the North East Asian zone of Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong SAR, Taiwan and Vietnam. It is coupled with Singapore in this analysis for historicalcultural reasons, as discussed below.
Russia and China entered the 1990s with a similar Soviet-shaped structure in science and higher education. After the 1949 revolution in China, Russian science and technology was far in advance of that of China. China was much poorer than Soviet Russia, and Soviet policy always saw capacity in science and technology as central to long-term survival. Until the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, Soviet aid and Soviet models played a strong role in China's development. China's higher education and research systems were closely influenced by Soviet forms. Under the Soviet model in China, science was concentrated in academies and specialised institutes associated with a range of ministries, while universities were predominantly teaching-focused, except for a small number of comprehensive institutions (Smolentseva, 2014; Hayhoe, Li, Lin and Zha, 2011) . Path dependence was established, so that the legacy of Soviet influence persisted even after the SinoSoviet split, up until China's reforms to education and science in the 1990s. To an extent, vestiges of the old Soviet model survive in China, in the form of instances of specialised universities under particular ministries, and in the major role played by the Academy of Science in China.
However, in the last two decades pathways have fundamentally diverged. First, while both countries have moved universities in the direction of comprehensive teaching/research institutions, and moved some specialised researchers from separate institutes into higher education, this process has gone much further in China than Russia. Second, investment patterns have been fundamentally different. The end of the Soviet period in Russia triggered the complete or partial collapse of many research organisations and the exit of a large number of trained personnel. This was just before China made the mid-1990s decision to invest heavily in science and research, and build an R&D sector on the American scale -an ambition once harboured by Soviet Russia, but, it seems, is less important to post-Soviet Russia, which has shifted its economic trajectory from a defence-driven military industrial state, to a predominantly resource-and finance-driven state.
Arguably, the Soviet system is still running down and the next Russian science system is yet to emerge. In Russia, in the last two decades, in contrast with almost every other research system in the industrialised world, published scientific outputs have declined, and there has been little progress in science infrastructure. In the same time period in East Asia and Singapore there has been a rapid and massive growth in research infrastructure and scientific outputs, and in the extent of internationalisation of science and universities. This happened in Japan earlier, between the 1960s/1980s. The dynamic growth of science spread to Korea, Taiwan and Singapore in the 1990s and to China in the last 15 years. The achievements of Chinese policy on science and universities are reviewed below. Japanese research is no longer improving, in terms of the quantity of science papers, the rate of citations, and the ranking of universities, but in the other East Asian countries rapid improvement continues, in all three categories, with no end in sight to the upward progress.
The role and character of the state has been key to the dynamic developments in East Asia and Singapore. These system share a common cultural foundation in Chinese civilization (Holcombe, 2011, pp. 1-10) , and are conventionally labeled 'Sinic'. Regardless of whether they are single party states or electoral democracies, countries shaped by Chinese civilization share a common mode of state and pursue similar policies on science and universities in the present period. This state tradition is distinct from the differing English-speaking, Western European and Russian state traditions. These differences between regional political cultures inhibit the potential of science policy transfer from, say, China to Russia, but perhaps there are still lessons to learn from East Asia.
Global developments
In the past, prior to the internet, science was something of a global conversation, but it was primarily organised in national systems. The global science and technology system now overshadows all national systems, even the gigantic American system. While that nation continues to play the leading world role, and sets many of the rules of global science -world journals are mostly US-edited -there is growing pluralisation as many other countries strengthen their capacity. The proportion of all science that is produced in the United States is falling (NSF, 2014) , an unstoppable tendency but one that generates concern in American circles. However, the point is that science is a single largely open system. There are pockets of secrecy, especially in relation to technology, for strategic military and industrial reasons, but the vast bulk of strategic knowledge -knowledge that is powerful and useful for states and companies -is in the open space and flows freely around the world. It is a remarkable change in human affairs. It calls up the need for new strategies and behaviours. 1995 (NSF, 2014 . The growing emphasis on research has become joined to widely distributed national policies designed to achieve 'world-class universities' (WCUs): higher education institutions (HEIs) that are listed in the world top 100, 200 or 500 in the research rankings, or to elevate the existing ranked universities. In 2013 the President of Russia announced there should be five Russian universities in the global top 100 by 2020. Government funding was allocated to develop 15 selected universities towards this goal (Vorotnikov, 2013) . There are significant WCU programmes in, among other countries, Germany, France, China, Japan, South Korea and Vietnam (Salmi, 2009) .
Science is no longer the province of the English-speaking world, Western Europe, Russia and Japan. It has become part of the business of middle income and emerging states. It seems that nations need an indigenous science infrastructure just as they need clean water, stable governance, and a globally viable financial sector. Most innovations in technology and product development, with the possible exception of innovations in the United States, are now sourced wholly or partly from outside the country, as opposed to being nationally sourced. (This follows directly from the pattern of publication of scientific knowledge -no country apart from the US publishes more than a small proportion of the highly cited science papers, and little basic science is now produced that remains outside the world literature. (NSF, 2014) ) Nations therefore need to be effective participants in the one-world science system and be fully in touch with current work; and to do this they must themselves be contributors and partners in the science system. In turn, to be producers of research they must have an indigenous research capacity and train at least some of their research personnel. The alternative is a position of continuing scientific and technological dependence.
The point cannot be emphasised too strongly. The effectiveness of national and university science -whether old or new -now depends on its capacity to operate globally. National and university science everywhere is positioned on the edge of the global science system, and feeds off it. Everyone is borrowing freely from everyone else in accessing the common store of knowledge. Countries partly disengaged from the global science system, like North Korea, are increasingly penalised. It is inevitable that they will fall behind. Because countries like North Korea do not work openly and collaborate freely, they do not have full access to knowledge and cutting edge expertise from elsewhere. Because they do not contribute freely into the global system, their scientists lack profile and fail to build international relationships, based on continuous exchange and collaboration, which allow them to anticipate new knowledge as it emerges. They do not draw strategic talent from other countries. Many of their best people want to leave to work at the cutting edge elsewhere. In this setting, open systems of science and people mobility prosper, like the American system. States with strong central authority in China, Korea and Singapore now realise this and have created broad highways between their science systems and the systems of other countries. Managed internationalisation is a vital tool of strategy in East Asia (Wang, Wang and Liu, 2011: Postiglione, 2011; Yonezawa, Kitamura, Meerman and Kuroda, 2104) .
The importance of states
All over the world the objective of state policy is to facilitate autonomous product innovations in capitalist industries. Nevertheless, in research and science, the state never finally vacates the field. Because research is largely a public good subject to market failure (Stiglitz, 1999) it depends on prolonged state investment. (This also makes research infrastructure irreducibly expensive, which means that the poorest nations, those with per capita incomes of about USD $8000 or less, cannot finance their own science systems, as is obvious from cross-country comparisons of research output: see NSF, 2014). Therefore science policy, and the organisational forms of research and research-based universities, are closely implicated in the nation's political culture, meaning that they are shaped by the tradition and evolution of the state.
In emerging systems the capability and focus of the state are crucial to building infrastructure, funding research personnel and organising the government institutes and universities where research takes place. In general, where the state is fragmented, weak, corrupt or lacks coherent policies, the potential of universities is limited. Significant research programmes -those that require expensive equipment, materials and trained personnel -cannot begin. Once indigenous science is established, the imperatives change. It becomes increasingly important to nurture the independent capacity of research professors, institute directors and university executive leaders to make operational decisions. For example, governments are not in a strong position to decide on the direction of scientific creativity in academic disciplines -only specialist researchers can do that (Kerr, 2001 ) -and are therefore unable to decide effectively on the desired national and international research partnerships. The state also needs to encourage direct relations between, on the one hand, research organisations, and on the other hand, cities and localities, professions and employers, in order to enable research to have maximum take-up and use. However, the dependence of researchers on the state never evaporates. Government remains crucial to funding, especially in relation to basic science, but often even in the subsidisation of commercially relevant research for industry (OECD, 2013) . Also, governments often intervene in research content decisions, perhaps more than they should. Most governments influence the directions of research by establishing broad priorities among disciplines, and they often pick favourites in relation to research topics, even when for the most part the detailed grant allocations are handled by scientific peers (OECD, 2008) .
Political cultures and state traditions vary across the world. Core notions of statescience relations, 'autonomy' and 'academic freedom' are practised in varying ways. All researchers want to operate free of interference, yet all are also nested in organisational and social contexts that sustain customary practices -whether through top-down regulation, or voluntary initiative (and self-censorship) -and shape human agency itself. Scientific freedom and creativity are not wholly universal qualities. There are irreducible historical-cultural elements.
1 In East Asia and Singapore, and also in Russia in a different way, the state retains closer supervision (even of leading research universities) than occurs in India, in the German, Francophone and Nordic countries (notwithstanding the large Nordic states) and in the English-speaking world. These differences do not in themselves determine success or failure in science policy. Clearly there is more than one way to sustain a high performing research system. The US/UK model -the template of global rankings and World Bank development programmes -the Nordic model, and the East Asian or 'Post-Confucian' model are all associated with successful science systems, in specific circumstances. By the same token, it would be misleading to argue that the East Asian (Sinic) state is both necessary and sufficient to achieving advanced science universities, in Asia or anywhere else. Nevertheless it is clear that this kind of state is effective in the accelerated development of science, under the right economic and cultural conditions.
Sinic states and Sinic learning
As noted, the East Asian countries and science systems lie within the historical boundaries of Sinic (Chinese) civilization. Arguably Vietnam, which was occupied by China for more than a thousand years, shares this geo-cultural region. The nonadjacent island state of Singapore in Southeast Asia has primarily Sinic political, economic and educational cultures. Although there are differences in language and political systems, and current tensions within the Sinic group, all sustain the comprehensive form of state that developed 2,200 years ago in Qin and Han China (Holcombe, 2011) . East Asian countries do not exhibit the state/society and state/market tensions typical of the English-speaking world, with its limited liberal states. Nor was East Asia closely affected by the egalitarian upheavals of the French revolution and nineteenth century social democracy. Whether in single party or multiparty polities, national states in East Asia exhibit strong continuity in policy and personnel and a characteristically long-term view (Jacques, 2012) . Government posts enjoy high social status, attracting many of the best graduates. The Sinic state is not a welfare state -the Sinic family has a larger role than in Europe and North America -but it exercises overall responsibility for social order and prosperity. Although the Sinic state does not administer society in detail, it is supreme viz a viz economies and cities, and intervenes at will (Gernet, 1996) . As noted, the present East Asian state intervenes in universities and science.
The Sinic societies also share a common heritage of Confucian learning practices in the family. From infancy, self-cultivation through education is part of the mutual responsibilities of parent and child, even in poor families. It is believed that success in education derives primarily from effort, not talent. There is a broader and deeper commitment to learning than in other societies, and the role of education in determining social destinations is near-universal (Zhao and Biesta, 2011) . In East Asia secondary education is highly competitive, culminating in end of school examinations that determine who enters the high prestige universities that are the fast track to stellar careers. Confucian self-formation in the home, a teaching profession in good standing, extra classes after school, and private tutoring, all contribute to exceptional levels of learning at school (Bray, 2007; Chua, 2012; Gernet, 1996) . East Asia and Singapore dominate the OECD's comparison of student learning achievement at age 15, the Program for International Student Achievement (PISA). In mathematics in the 2012 PISA results the leading seven systems were all post-Confucian. They did almost as well in PISA science and reading. Even Vietnam, with a per capita income of only 10 per cent of the US in 2013, does better than both the US and Russia in all three PISA disciplines (OECD, 2014). As Table 2 shows, not only are the average PISA scores very high, the size of the highest achieving group is large, and there are few students in the lowest achieving group. In Singapore, 40 per cent of students are in levels 5-6 in PISA, compared to 8.8 per cent in the US. Only 8.3 per cent of Singaporean students are in the bottom group in PISA, compared to 24 per cent in Russia (OECD, 2014) . Although postConfucian societies are not egalitarian, student learning is distributed on an egalitarian basis without a trade-off between equity and excellence. It is a strong foundation on which to build a national science system. Not only is there a large pool of potential candidates for research and other science-specific roles, many people working in business, government and the professions tend to be comfortable with science and technology.
In addition to these elements from tradition, the Han comprehensive state and the Confucian education family, all Sinic countries have undergone an accelerated modernisation stimulated by imperial intervention and later by global competition. Economic prosperity has been both cause and effect of this. The central state strategic focus on 'catch up to the West', in education and elsewhere, is feasible because of sustained high economic growth. One feature of the Sinic state is its capacity to mobilise the population on the basis of deep common commitment. While East Asian states play an essential role in developing science education (Freeman, Marginson and Tytler, 2014) in leading universities and the research system, they do so in tandem with strong drivers in the household . Intense family investment in tuition beyond the formal classroom combines with society-wide pride in 'rising China', 'rising Korea', etc. The term 'post-Confucian' captures the way that inner tradition is hybridised with modernisation, which takes the form of external pressures that are absorbed into personal and national identity.
Research-based science in East Asia
In the last two decades, all countries in East Asia have increased their R&D at a rapid rate, except Japan and Vietnam. In Hong Kong SAR, the GDP share allocation to research is modest, but GDP per head is high and so even at a low GDP rate the research universities are well funded. China's spending on R&D is on track to pass the US in the next decade. Research is closely tailored to centrally-determined disciplinary priorities and joined to strategies for building capacity and continually improving outputs. Singapore and China especially, and to a lesser extent other systems, pursue internationalisation strategies designed to force early and rapid improvement, such as benchmarking with leading American universities and incentives to publish in English in leading journals. Taiwan, Korea and China have pursued successful policies designed to attract their overseas trained nationals at post-doctoral and mid career stages back home. Singapore, Hong Kong and, in selected areas, China, offer internationally competitive salaries. Published science is increasing almost as quickly as funding. Between 2001 and 2011, the number of journal articles authored or co-authored by Chinese scholars rose by 15.6 per cent a year (see Figure 2 , which compares the growth of science in China to the slower but significant increase in India, and decline in Russia). Over the same time period, published papers grew 8.8 per cent a year in Korea, 6.4 per cent in Singapore and 6.5 per cent in Taiwan.
It is often argued that East Asian science has yet to prove itself because quality is lower than the US and Western Europe, as measured by citation rates. Average citation rates are much lower than in the leading English-language countries, Germany and the smaller Northwest Source: Leiden University, 2014
Aside from the Confucian educational ethic in the home and high student learning achievement in the teenage years, and high rates of economic growth, what other factors have conditioned the phenomenally rapid growth of East Asian science? The short answer is effective Sinic states, and effective programmes for accelerated internationalisation, carried out under the auspices of those states. In East Asia, government is politicised like it is everywhere, but on the whole it is more meritocratic and performance-driven, and mostly less corrupt, than the state in the post-socialist countries (Marginson, 2010-13) . The East Asian states give high priority to science, focus substantial investment in it, and set performance targets that are authentic, not just words on paper. They monitor the achievement of those targets, then they raise the targets further to drive progress. The result is real and rapid improvement (Marginson, 2011a) . Internationalisation has been a key driver of improvements. Encouraged by the state, universities set incentives for English language publication, bring back the diaspora from the US and attract new foreign talent, support collaboration with foreign scholar-researchers, and engage in systematic benchmarking with strong foreign universities (Wang, et al., 2011) . A benchmarking approach to international comparison is a more focused, contextually appropriate, detailed and transformative strategy than a rankings approach (Altbach & Salmi, 2011) . East Asian governments see better rankings for their universities as the outcome of policy and of better performance, not as a principal policy instrument or driver (Liu & Cheng, 2005) . To focus on ranking outcomes as the objective of policy is to focus on reputation, and the appearance of global strength -rather than focusing on real education, real science and the substance of global strength.
Research-based science in Russia
Russia's current investment in R&D as a percentage of GDP is lower on the international scale than was Soviet R&D, and it is likely that it is lower in absolute terms (constant prices) than the peak R&D spending in the Soviet years. Figure 1 shows that Russia was 10th in total R&D in 2012. Although funding doubled between 2000 and 2012, it was from a low base. Russia's 2012 level of investment was only 6.1 per cent that of the US, 11.4 per cent that of China, and less than half the level of South Korea which has only one third of Russia's population (UNESCO, 2014) . Figure 3 provides data on the proportion of GDP allocated to R&D in 2012 (or nearest year). It clusters national systems on a regional basis. Russia's total investment in R&D of 1.12 per cent of GDP in 2012 was the lowest of the top 10 R&D countries except for India. Russia's investment in research was higher than South Africa but below Brazil and well below China. However, it is probably more appropriate to compare Russia not to the BRICS, which are only now developing high capacity systems, but to the English-speaking and Western European nations that, like Russia, have a longer history of developed research. In Figures 1 and 3 the standout countries are the US, the dominant world power in R&D, the smaller knowledge-intensive European countries in Scandinavia and Switzerland that have high rates of GDP investment, and the rising science powers in East Asia and Singapore. Russia's international position in globally published science is weaker than its comparative R&D investment. Russia was 10th in investment in 2012 but 15th in the number of science papers produced in 2011. Russia's output of published science in 2011 was 6.6 per cent that of the US, and 15.8 per cent that of China. As indicated in Figure 2 , the output of published science papers fell from 15,658 in 2001 to 14,151 in 2011, an average annual decline of one per cent. Along with Japan (1.7 per cent per year) and Sweden (0.6 per cent per year) Russia was one of only three countries in the top 20 research producers where output declined. The average annual growth in output on a worldwide basis was 2.8 per cent (NSF, 2014) . The decline of output in Russia can be attributed to the continued erosion and ageing of the Soviet research system, the slow emergence of comprehensive research universities, and the slow rate at which the whole system has internationalised. Published science in Russia is weaker than funded research in part because much research in Russia takes place in the academies and other institutes outside the universities, and in specialist universities that service local manufacturing, energy, extraction and defence sectors (Scimago, 2014) . Many of the papers produced by specialist institutes and universities are in Russian not English, do not show up in the global science data, and do not lead to worldwide exchange of knowledge. There is nothing wrong with doing useful research, of course. Ideally, however, researchers are fluent and active in both the national and global languages, and both research conversations, rather than only one. The problem here is not just a lack of English language versions of the research findings: the weakness in the global engagement of Russian science means localised work simply never gets close to the common global pool of knowledge, which contains the overwhelming bulk of new scientific ideas. As noted, between 1995 and 2012 the world's total number of journal articles with international co-authors rose by 168 per cent, much faster than the number of journal articles as a whole. In China, South Korea and Singapore, joint publishing multiplied by 8-12 times, depending on country. In Russia the number of jointly published articles rose only 35 per cent in that 17 year period (NSF, 2014), meaning that there has been little opening up since Soviet times. Further, in its failure to grow collaborations sharply in the global era, Russia's science system has been radically out of step with most of the rest of the world, and radically out of step with all leading research countries outside Russia, whatever their political regime or foreign policy.
The Soviet strategy was 'science and technology in one country'. Contacts between Russian and foreign researchers were not encouraged (Smolentseva, 2014) . Useful research from abroad was translated into Russian, and fed into the bounded national science system. Little research flowed out, to avoid giving away strategic secrets and to keep researchers in Russia (Marginson, 2010 . The closed-door legacy of this period continues to retard global awareness and engagement. The imperative of globalisation is that the barriers come down and it becomes necessary to move freely between local/national/global dimensions, while maintaining a clear national identity and strategy (Marginson, 2011b) . The Russian science system does not foster these attributes sufficiently, instead fostering too many people who find a way to turn their backs on the global realm. Russian science and technology are less internationalised than those of all the other nations ahead of Russia in the comparative tables. It seems that the focus on local research problems is often seen to be in opposition to, rather than in conjunction with, global research work (Marginson, 2010 . In short, there is a highly fragmented connection between the global science system and the national science system. Arguably, in many fields, a better term for the state of affairs is 'disconnect'.
Individual research organisations in Russia
Given these problems, how well do individual Russian research universities, the academy of sciences and the non-university research institutes, perform in comparative terms? One way to answer this question is by looking at science publication and citation data in detail. The most useful data sets are from Leiden University, based on Thomson-Reuters Web of Knowledge, and Simago, based on the Scopus data set from Elsevier. The Leiden University ranking provides separate measures for each university of total science papers in global journals, citations per paper, and the proportion of all published papers in the top 10 per cent of their field of research, on the basis of citation rate. Leiden looks at just the top 750 universities in the world by paper volume. Table 4 shows that at present, in terms of global science, Lomonosov Moscow State is simply not in the same league as the top universities in the English-speaking world and Germany, and has been left well behind by the two Beijing universities in China and the large University of Sao Paulo in Brazil. Sao Paulo has a lower proportion of high citation papers than LMSU (4.6 per cent compared to 4.8 per cent) but a better average citation rate. In aggregate terms it pumps out many more papers and many more high citation papers. Like LMSU, Sao Paulo has the disadvantage of being a major national leader operating in a global research setting, but it is clear from these data that Sao Paulo's academic staff are more actively bilingual -they publish more than four times as many papers in English as staff from LMSU. Also, the University of Capetown in South Africa is much stronger than LMSU in citation quality (Leiden University, 2014) .
Leiden also provides breakdowns of the above data on the basis of broad discipline groups, enabling universities' strong research areas to be identified. At LMSU there is no strong area. The high citation proportion is greater in earth and environmental sciences (7.9 per cent, with an average citation rate of 0.77) than other areas. There are no high citation papers in the English language literature in cognitive and social sciences. Despite Russia's historical strengths in mathematics and engineering there were only 15 high citation papers in those disciplines over the four years, and 4.7 per cent of all papers received high citations. The average citation rate was 0.63 (Leiden University, 2014).
These data underline the distance that even the nation's top research university must travel in order to match the research capacity and performance of the leading universities in Europe, the English-speaking systems and East Asia. This should not be surprising. It has taken 15 years for China to build a strong research system on the basis of exceptional and continually increasing levels of investment, and China does not yet have top 100 universities except on the basis of volume of papers. It has taken 25 years of exceptional investment and focused policy for the National University of Singapore -which at this stage is significantly stronger in research than any mainland Chinese university -to achieve the standard of a leading Northwestern European university in citation rates and high citation papers.
The Scopus data collection Scimago, unlike the Leiden ranking, allows the output of non-university research organisations to be explored. There are more papers in the Scimago collection than in the Leiden collection because there is greater inclusion of formats other than research articles. In addition, the Scimago collection includes 2,744 university and non-university research organisations ranked in order of volume of papers, many more than the 500 in ARWU and the 750 in Leiden, and this allows other Russian universities and research institutes to be investigated. Table 5 shows that China strongly outperforms both the Russian academy and the Russian universities. For a non English-speaking country China's Academy of Science, which in volume terms is the second largest research organisation in the world, has a good academic impact factor (normalised across academic fields) of 1.01. Tsinghua is at 0.96. The Russian academy is the third largest research organisation in the world but the impact average for the papers published in English is only 0.54, and below LMSU at a low 0.63 (Scimago, 2014) . (Scimago, 2014) . Six of the leading 12 organisations on impact are part of the Academy of Sciences, indicating that, notwithstanding its poor overall impact, it retains pockets of research excellence.
Conclusions
In summary, the system attributes that are associated with the spectacular success of China and other East Asian countries, in building science capacity and outputs, are absent or largely absent in Russia. First, like most countries, Russia lacks the Confucian learning tradition at home; and in-school learning achievement is average in terms of international comparisons. Traditionally Russians see their nation as strong in mathematics and physics. This does not show in the PISA results. However, it is apparent in pockets of research excellence, as the Scimago data reveal. The quality of physics-related research can be understood as part of the legacy of state-managed Soviet science.
Second, Russia has not benefitted from economic growth on the scale of China, which in China has augmented household incomes, which in turn are fed into part of the cost of tuition. This has released the state to fund infrastructure, research, WCUs and scholarships for high achieving students. Yet Russia has experienced economic growth, albeit on a more modest scale than China, and arguably could have expanded R&D funding more than it has.
Third, and most importantly, Russia lacks an East Asian-style state. The characteristic East Asian state takes a comprehensive responsibility for social order and prosperity. The quality of the bureaucracy is high and the merit principle is generally accepted. There is corruption, but arguably on a lower scale than in the Soviet and post-Soviet states. In science in China, a larger problem than corruption is (a) arbitrary government interference in decisions that should be made by scientists and based on the logic of development of knowledge, rather than political factors, and (b) cases of repression of and pressure on critical public intellectuals. The last used to also be a problem in one-party Singapore, and arguably the potential is still there. Over-centralisation and top-downism are inherent tendencies of the Sinic state but it is possible to avoid the worst excesses. The Sinic state also has a long-term approach and is both critical and realistic. It creates an authentic policy setting -targets and performance measures are real and compliance must be substantial, rather than ritualistic (or faked). And the Sinic state has an inbuilt focus on catching up to the West and benchmarks everything instinctively in terms of leading countries. Thus it readily fosters internationalisation strategies in science and these have been crucial.
Finally, as discussed, Russian science has low levels of international engagement by comparison with parallel national science systems across the world -in the Englishspeaking world, both of Western and Eastern Europe, East and Southeast Asia, Brazil and India. Russia is partly decoupled from and ineffective within the global research system. English-language skills are not developing rapidly as they are in East Asia, and the comparative publication, citation and research collaboration data indicate a serious problem.
Russia cannot replicate the Sinic family. It cannot become a Sinic state. However, it can return to being a nation-building state of the Russian kind in universities and research, and it can internationalise its research system if it chooses to do so.
Countries with a broad range of political cultures and institutional configurations have internationalised univiersities and science. Nevertheless, universities, research institutes and the academy of sciences are unlikely to take internationalisation far without strong policy buy-in by the state. The ultimate key to a renovated research system in Russia is reform of government. In science policy, the post-Soviet state inherited from the breakup of the Soviet Union has been lethargic, parsimonious, and at worst, indifferent to the running down of research. Until the culture of government changes, Russia will not be able to return to the front table in science.
